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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a medical negligence case wherein Charles Lepper and Janice Lepper 
("Plaintiffs") failed to comply with the district court's scheduling order governing the disclosure 
of expert witnesses, Plaintiffs' expert witnesses were excluded, and summary judgment was 
entered in favor of Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc. d/b/a Eastern Idaho Regional Medical 
Center ("EIRMC") and Stephen R. Marano, M.D. ("Dr. Marano"). 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice pre-litigation screening application against EIRMC 
with regard to this matter dated April 11, 2011, which was received by the Idaho State Board of 
Medicine on April 15, 2011. R. Vol. 8, pp. 1203OOO-1203RRR. Plaintiffs commenced this 
lawsuit against EIRMC on June 17, 2011. R. Vol. 1, pp. 16-23. Service of process was effected 
upon EIRMC on July 1, 2011. R. Vol. 1, p. 24A. Plaintiffs made no attempt to secure a nursing 
expert in this case during 2011. R. Vol. 6, p. 800 (i! 4); R. Vol. 7, p. 1010 (i! 7). Plaintiffs made 
no attempt to secure a nursing expert in this case during 2012. Id. Plaintiffs made no attempt to 
secure a nursing expert in this case for the first eight and a half (8 ½ ) months of 2013, a mere 
two months prior to their expert witness disclosure deadline. R., Vol. 6, p. 800 (i! 4). 
On January 18, 2013, the district court entered its Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial, 
which states in part: 
I. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
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4. Plaintiff(s) expert witness disclosure, including opinions and 
conclusions must be filed at least 100 days before trial. Defendant(s) expert 
witness disclosure including opinions and conclusions must be filed at least 80 
days before trial. Plaintiff's rebuttal expert(s) shall be disclosed within 70 days. 
5. Failure to object to any expert witness disclosure within twenty days 
of the required disclosure shall be deemed a waiver of objection. 
R. Vol. 1, p. 89 (emphasis added). 
The parties entered into a Stipulation that modified that expert witness disclosure as 
follows: 
(1) Plaintiffs' expert witness disclosure, including opinions and conclusions 
must be filed [on] or before October 30, 2013, Defendants' expert witness 
disclosure, including opinions and conclusions, must be filed on or before 
December 16, 2013, and Plaintiffs' rebuttal expert witness disclosure, including 
opinions and conclusions, must be filed on or before January 16, 2014. 
R. Vol. 1, p. 93B (emphasis added). 
At no time prior to the October 30, 2013 expert witness disclosure deadline for Plaintiffs 
did Plaintiffs ever request an extension of time, either from any counsel or from the district court. 
On October 30, 2013, Plaintiffs filed their expert witness disclosure and produced, through 
discovery, the expert witness reports for, among others, Dr. W. Bradford DeLong ("DeLong") 
and Elizabeth Arruda ("Arruda"). R. Vol. 2, pp. 168VVVVV-168ZZZZZZZ. Plaintiffs 
represented in their expert witness disclosure that "IRCP 26 disclosures regarding Dr. DeLong's 
[ and] Nurse Arruda' s testimony are being contemporaneously provided to counsel through 
discovery supplementation." R. Vol. 2, 168X:XXXX-168YYYYY. However, said disclosure 
and reports were: devoid of any showing that Arruda and DeLong had made any attempt to 
become familiar with the applicable local standard of health care practice for nurses practicing in 
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Idaho Falls, Idaho in September 201 O; that they were familiar with the applicable local standard 
of health care practice for nurses practicing in Idaho Falls, Idaho in September 2010; or even that 
the standard of health care practice applicable as to either EIRMC or Dr. Marano was 
indeterminable. R. Vol. 2, pp. 168VVVVV-168ZZZZZZZ. 
In addition to the district court's scheduling order requiring the disclosure of such 
information (opinions and conclusions of the experts), both EIRMC and Dr. Marano had 
requested such information through discovery requests. Plaintiffs specifically responded to said 
discovery responses by referring to their expert witness reports, representing that said reports 
contained a complete statement of all opinions and conclusions to be expressed in this matter 
(which would include any and all opinions/conclusions relating to familiarization with the 
applicable local standard of health care practice) and the specific facts and data upon which such 
opinions are based. R. Vol. 2, pp. 168EEEEE-168GGGGG; 168IIIII-168JJJJJ. 
As required by the district court's scheduling order, EIRMC filed its Motion to Exclude 
Expert Testimony of Elizabeth Arruda and W. Bradford DeLong and supporting documents 
within twenty (20) days of Plaintiffs disclosing their expert witnesses. R. Vol. 2, pp. 168UUUU-
168GGGGGGGGGGGG. IfEIRMC had not filed its objections and Motion to Exclude Expert 
Testimony of Elizabeth Arruda and W. Bradford DeLong within twenty (20) days of Plaintiffs 
disclosing their expert witnesses, such objections would have been waived pursuant to the 
express provisions of the district court's Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial. R. Vol. 1, p. 89 
On December 3, 2013, the district court heard EIRMC's Motion to Exclude Expert 
Witnesses and granted the same with regard to Arruda and De Long. During the course of the 
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December 3, 2013 hearing on EIRMC's and Dr. Marano's motions to exclude Plaintiffs' expert 
witnesses, co-counsel for Plaintiffs, Breck Barton, intimated that experts Arruda and DeLong 
were familiar with the applicable local standards of health care practice at issue in the case and 
that the information merely had to be requested. Mr. Barton stated as follows: 
Now, I can represent to you as an officer of the Court that these people would not 
give opinions that they weren't prepared foundationally to back up and do it 
properly. 
Tr., p. 13, L. 8-10. 
I guess the point that I'm making, your Honor, is this: There are various ways that 
an expert can become familiar. If they want to know, they can ask. And we're 
willing to tell them. I mean, this isn't a hide the ball. This isn't a contest of cat 
and mouse. We're willing to tell them. 
Tr., p. 18, L. 20-24. 
The district court ruled at the hearing: "That testimony is not relevant, it's not going to be 
allowed, and the testimony is precluded." Tr., p. 25, L. 19-20. The district court also entered an 
order on its ruling: 
Plaintiffs' disclosures as to these expert witnesses do not include the elements 
required by LC. § 6-1012, i.e. knowledge of the local standard of care. Plaintiffs' 
duty to disclose included the duty to disclose all testimony which would establish 
the witness' competency to testify: "The party offering the evidence must also 
affirmatively show that the witness is competent to testify about the matters stated 
in his testimony." Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 156 P.3d 533 (2007). The 
disclosures of Arruda and Delong do not affirmatively show their knowledge as to 
the local standard of care, and how they came by that knowledge. As such, their 
testimony as reflected in the record is irrelevant. 
R. Vol. 3, pp.188-189. 
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Only after the district court had excluded the testimony of Arruda and DeLong in its 
December 3, 2013, Order did Plaintiffs file a Motion to Supplement Expert Witness Disclosures 
and to Extend Disclosures Deadline, along with a Motion to Reconsider the district court's 
December 3, 2013, Order. On December 5, 2013, the district issued its Order on Motion to 
Reconsider, Extension of Time, Etc. and denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration. The 
district court observed: 
... the Court finds it difficult to understand how Plaintiffs could consider a 
disclosure adequate when the opinions and conclusions set out in the disclosure 
would not even be admissible at trial, but for compliance with the foregoing 
statutes [LC.§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013]. As such, it is the Court's opinion that 
Plaintiffs' disclosure as to Arruda and Delong should have included information 
as to their knowledge of the local standard of care or otherwise how their 
testimony would be admissible under Idaho law. 
R. Vol. 3, p. 205. 
However, the district court also ruled: 
... Plaintiffs shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of this order to provide 
Defendants with supplemental disclosures as to Arruda and Delong which 
disclosures are to identify (1) whether they are familiar with the local standard of 
care, and if so, how they became familiar with the local standard of care, and (2) 
if not familiar with the local standard of care, the basis by which their testimony 
would otherwise be admissible under Idaho law. 
R. Vol. 3, p. 206. 
On December 18, 2013, Plaintiffs produced a new report from Arruda dated December 
17, 2013. Said report confirmed that Arruda was not familiar with the applicable local standard 
of health care practice for nurses practicing in Idaho Falls, Idaho in September of 2010. In fact, 
said report confirmed that Arruda had not spoken with anyone regarding the local standard of 
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health care practice for nurses practicing in Idaho Falls, Idaho in September 2010 until 
December 9, 2013, forty (40) days after Arruda's opinions and conclusions were due in this case 
and only after EIRMC and Dr. Marano objected to Plaintiffs' expert witness disclosure, had a 
hearing on the objections, and the district court issued an Order excluding Arruda and DeLong 
from testifying. R. Vol. 5, p.734DD. Said report contained new opinions regarding the local 
standard of health care practice and disclosed a new previously undisclosed expert opinion 
witness. R. Vol. 5, pp. 734DD-734EE. 
EIRMC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the district court's December 5, 2013, 
Order and supporting documents. R. Vol. 5, pp. 617-619; 620-636; 734A-734T. Dr. Marano 
joined EIRMC's Motion for Reconsideration of the district court's December 5, 2013, Order. R. 
Vol. 5, pp. 734W-734Y. On January 14, 2014, the district court entered its Order on Defendants' 
Motion to Reconsider wherein it reinstated its original ruling that Arruda's and DeLong's 
testimony was irrelevant and that they were precluded from testifying in this matter. R. Vol. 6, 
pp. 767-770. The district court observed and ruled: 
At the time of the hearing, the Court sustained the object[ion] precluding the 
testimony on the grounds that the testimony was irrelevant since it was not related 
to a local standard of care. However, through various statements made at the time 
of the objection hearing [the] Court believed that the defective disclosure was 
perhaps due to inadvertence in disclosing how the experts became familiar with a 
local standard of care. The Court's comments at that time could have been 
considered an invitation to Plaintiffs to seek additional time to disclose expert 
testimony so as to include the element of the local standard of care. 
Plaintiffs thereafter sought reconsideration and although the Court continued to 
hold that the then-disclosed expert testimony remained irrelevant, the Court 
granted additional time to supplement the expert testimony. 
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In review, it is now clear that this was not a situation where there was an 
inadvertent failure in disclosing how the expert witnesses were familiar with 
the local standard of care, but rather a complete failure on the part of the 
expert witnesses to familiarize themselves with the standard of care. As such, 
as of the time of the disclosures were due, as of the time Defendants objected, 
as of the time of the hearing on the objection, and as of the time Plaintiffs' 
sought reconsideration and additional time, Plaintiffs' experts had still not 
familiarized themselves with the local standard of care. There was no 
showing of good cause why the experts had not previously familiarized 
themselves with the standard of care, but simply a request for additional time to 
do so . 
. . . Because the testimony of Arruda and Delong as disclosed pursuant to the 
scheduling order did not include a familiarity with the local standard of care, their 
testimony is irrelevant and they will be precluded from testifying. To the extent 
Defendants believe this ruling is dispositive of the case, they may file a motion 
for summary judgment. The motion may be based on the record without the need 
for a hearing. 
R. Vol. 6, pp. 768, 770 (emphasis added). 
Based upon the district court's January 14, 2014, Order on Defendants' Motion to 
Reconsider EIRMC and Dr. Marano filed Motions for Summary Judgment on January 14, 2014. 
R. Vol. 6, pp. 775-780. On January 21, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration 
seeking reconsideration of the district court's January 14, 2014, Order on Defendants' Motion to 
Reconsider. On February 14, 2014, the district court entered its Order on Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Reconsider, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment wherein the district court denied 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and granted EIRMC's and Dr. Marano's Motions for Summary 
Judgment. The district court held: 
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Again, the purpose of the scheduling order was to require full disclosure of 
anticipated testimony and allow the opposing party time to prepare for it. The 
purpose of the order was also to preclude a flurry of motions shortly before trial 
regarding expert witnesses, challenging testimony, and motions seeking additional 
time. Additionally, the purpose of the scheduling order was not to require 
Defendants to identify the defects of a witness disclosure and then allow 
Plaintiffs additional time to attempt to cure the defects. 
This Court is not without sympathy as to the medical challenges facing Plaintiffs' 
counsel. However, Mr. Barton did not appear as counsel for Plaintiffs until 
December 3, 2013, long after the time for disclosure of expert witness testimony. 
Furthermore, there was no request prior to the disclosure deadline to allow 
additional time to disclose expert witness testimony. Medical issues of counsel 
were raised only after the disclosures were due, after Defendants' objections, and 
after the Court's ruling finding the testimony irrelevant. Plaintiffs knew from the 
time of the prelitigation screening panel in April 2011 that their expert witness 
testimony would have to meet the requirements of§ 6-1012 and§ 6-1013. If 
sudden and unforeseeable personal circumstances precluded counsel's ability to 
prepare their expert witness testimony, a motion for additional time should have 
been made prior to the expert witness disclosure date. 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is denied. 
As set out above, the Court has precluded the testimony ofDeLong and Arruda in 
that there was no timely disclosure of a familiarity with the local standard of care 
( or the standard of care of a similar Idaho community). Again, where the focus is 
on the time for the original disclosures, subsequent disclosures or testimony by 
affidavit should not be considered i.e., that testimony has been precluded. 
Testimony that is precluded from trial cannot be used to preclude summary 
judgment. To this extent, Plaintiffs' recent affidavits attempting to establish 
compliance with § 6-1012 will not be considered. 
Where this Court has precluded the testimony of DeLong and Arruda, and there is 
no dispute that absent that testimony Plaintiffs cannot present a prima facie case 
of malpractice against Defendants, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. 
R. Vol. 8, pp. 1207-1208 (emphasis added). 
The district court also entered a Final Judgment on February 14, 2014. R. Vol. 8, p. 1210. 
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On February 28, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider seeking reconsideration of 
the district court's "Order on Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider, Defendants' Motions for 
Summary Judgment entered February 14, 2014 and the resulting Judgment dismissing plaintiffs' 
Complaint with prejudice entered February 14, 2014." R. Vol. 8, pp. 1268-1269. EIRMC and 
Dr. Marano opposed Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider and the district court entered its Order on 
March 14, 2014 denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. R. Vol. 8, pp. 1302-1304. The 
district court held in part: "The Court previously ruled that the testimony of Plaintiffs' experts 
was inadmissible. The Court then concluded that that same inadmissible testimony could not be 
used to preclude summary judgment." R. Vol. 8, p. 1303. Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal 
on March 27, 2014. R. Vol. 8, p. 1306. 
C. Statement of Facts 
The medical facts of this matter are more complicated than those set forth under Section 
II.C. of Appellants' Brief, however, the factual nature of this case is irrelevant to this appeal. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Is EIRMC entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-
121 and Rules 40 and 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules? 
III. ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs failed to comply with the district court's scheduling order. EIRMC and Dr. 
Marano timely made objections to Plaintiffs' deficient expert witness disclosures, and the district 
court ultimately excluded Plaintiffs' expert witnesses resulting in summary judgment being 
entered in favor ofEIRMC and Dr. Marano. The district court's orders upholding its scheduling 
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order, excluding Plaintiffs' expert witnesses, and granting EIRMC's and Dr. Marano's motions 
for summary judgment should be affirmed. 
A. The District Court was correct in excluding Plaintiffs' expert witnesses based upon 
its pretrial order, which required Plaintiffs to disclose all opinions and conclusions 
of their expert witnesses on or before October 30, 2013. 
This Court has held: 
A trial court has authority to sanction parties for non-compliance with pretrial 
orders, and sanctions may include those enumerated in I.R.C.P. 3 7(b )(2)(B), (C) 
and (D) for discovery violations. I.R.C.P. 16(i). The imposition of such sanctions 
is committed to the discretion of the trial court, and we will not overturn such a 
decision absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. S. Idaho Prod. Credit Ass 'n v. 
Astorquia, 113 Idaho 526, 528, 746 P.2d 985, 987 (1987). When determining 
whether a district court abused its discretion, this Court considers three factors: 
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) 
whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with 
applicable legal principles, and (3) whether it reached its decision through an 
exercise ofreason. Lamar Corp. v. City o,fTwin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 40,981 P.2d 
1146, 1150 (1999). 
Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 872-73, 136 P.3d 338, 343-344 (2006). 
The district court's scheduling order, as modified by the parties' Stipulation required 
Plaintiffs' expert witness disclosure, including opinions and conclusions by October 30, 2013. 
R. Vol. 1, pp. 89, 93B. This Court has held: 
In order for expert testimony to be admissible in an Idaho medical malpractice 
action, the party must demonstrate: 
(a) that such opinion is actually held by the expert witness; (b) that 
the expert witness can testify to the opinion with a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty; ( c) that the expert witness possesses 
professional knowledge and expertise; and ( d) that the expert 
witness has actual knowledge of the applicable community 
standard of care to which his expert opinion testimony is 
addressed. 
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Id. (citing LC.§ 6-1013) (emphasis added). Additionally, LC.§ 6-1012 defines 
the community standard of care as: 
(a) the standard of care for the class of health care provider to 
which the defendant belonged and was functioning, taking into 
account the defendant's training, experience, and fields of medical 
specialization, if any; (b) as such standard existed at the time of the 
defendant's alleged negligence; and ( c) as such standard existed at 
the place of the defendant's alleged negligence. Dulaney, 137 
Idaho at 164, 45 P.3d at 820 (citing LC. § 6-1012) (internal 
citations omitted). 
Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 115-116, 254 P.3d 11, 16-17 (2011). 
An expert testifying as to the standard of care in medical malpractice 
actions must show that he or she is familiar with the standard of care for the 
particular health care professional for the relevant community and time." 
Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 137 Idaho 160, 164, 45 P.3d 
816, 820 (2002). "The statute [LC. § 6-1012] is both site and time specific." 
Gubler v. Boe, 120 Idaho 294,296, 815 P.2d 1034, 1036 (1991). If the out-of-
area expert consults with an Idaho physician to learn the applicable standard of 
care, there must be evidence showing that the Idaho physician knows that 
applicable standard of care. Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 
137 Idaho 160, 45 P.3d 816 (2002) (the out-of-state expert's opinion lacked 
foundation where he had talked with a Boise physician practicing internal 
medicine but there was no showing that the Boise physician would know the 
standard of care for emergency room physicians in Boise). 
Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 37, 156 P.3d 533, 538 (2007). 
Experts testifying as to the standard of care in medical malpractice actions must 
show that they have familiarized themselves with the standard for a particular 
profession for the relevant community and time. See Kolin v. Saint Luke ·s Reg 'l 
Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 331, 940 P.2d 1142, 1150 (1997). They must also state 
how they became familiar with the standard of care for the particular health care 
professional. Id. 
Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 51,995 P.2d 816,821 (2000). 
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In this case, Plaintiffs' expert witness disclosures, including opinions and conclusions of 
those experts, were due by October 30, 2013. Plaintiffs' Disclosure of Expert Witnesses and the 
reports submitted by Elizabeth Arruda and W. Bradford DeLong failed to include any opinions, 
conclusions, and/or statements that either one of them made any attempt to become familiar with 
the applicable standards of health care practice in this case or that they were familiar with the 
applicable local standards of health care practice in this case. Accordingly, pursuant to the 
Court's Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial, EIRMC filed its objection/motion to exclude the 
testimony of Arruda and DeLong within twenty (20) days of Plaintiffs' expert witness disclosure. 
Pursuant to the express provisions of the district court's pretrial scheduling order, EIRMC would 
have waived such objections if not made within the twenty (20) day time period. The district 
court granted EIRMC's motion holding: 
Plaintiffs' duty to disclose included the duty to disclose all testimony which 
would establish the witness' competency to testify: 'The party offering the 
evidence must also affirmatively show that the witness is competent to testify 
about the matters stated in his testimony.' Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 156 
P.3d 533 (2007). The disclosures of Arruda and Delong do not affirmatively 
show their knowledge as to the local standard of care, and how they came to that 
knowledge. As such, their testimony as reflected in the record is irrelevant. 
R. Vol. 3, p. 189. 
Plaintiffs contend that they were not required to disclose on October 30, 2013 their expert 
witnesses' opinions and conclusions regarding how they familiarized themselves with the 
applicable standards of health care practice in this case. Such a position is directly contrary to 
the district court's pretrial scheduling order. The district court's order required disclosure of 
each expert witness's opinions and conclusions. Pursuant to the Idaho statutes and case law 
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precedent cited above there is no question that information regarding how an expert witness 
becomes familiar with the applicable standard of health care practice in a medical malpractice 
action is "part and parcel" of any opinions/conclusions that Plaintiffs' experts could have in this 
matter. It is axiomatic that experts in a medical malpractice action actually possess opinions and 
conclusions on what the applicable standard of health care practice is before opining and/or 
concluding that the applicable standard of health care practice was allegedly breached. Stated 
another way, how could Plaintiffs experts state that the applicable standards of health care 
practice in this case were breached if they did not even possess knowledge of what the applicable 
standard of health care was? 
Plaintiffs contention is also contrary to their own expert witness disclosure and discovery 
responses they submitted contemporaneously with their expert witness disclosures. Plaintiffs' 
expert witness disclosure specifically stated: "IRCP 26 disclosures regarding Dr. DeLong's [and] 
Nurse Arruda's testimony are being contemporaneously provided to counsel through discovery 
supplementation." R. Vol. 2, 168XXXXX-168YYYYY. EIRMC and Dr. Marano had both 
requested from Plaintiffs in discovery requests a statement of the opinions to be expressed by 
Plaintiffs' experts and the specific facts, basis, and reasons for any such opinions. In response to 
such requests, Plaintiffs specifically referred to the reports of Arruda and DeLong that were 
produced on or about October 30, 2013 and stated: "See attached report and CV relating to 
substance of opinions or other testimony the expert is expected to give at trial, and the specific 
facts and data upon which such opinions are based." R. Vol. 2, pp. 168EEEEE-168GGGGG; 
168IIIII-168JJJJJ. Accordingly, Plaintiffs represented that their expert witness disclosure and 
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accompanying expert reports contained all of their experts' opinions, conclusions, and the 
specific facts, basis, and reasons for any such opinions, which would axiomatically include any 
and all opinions, conclusions, and information regarding their knowledge of the applicable local 
standard of health care practice. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs contention that their experts' opinions and conclusions regarding 
their knowledge of the applicable local standard of health care practice and how they came by 
such opinions and conclusions did not have to be produced as part of their experts' opinions and 
conclusions is without merit. Consequently, the district court perceived the issue as one of 
discretion, acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal 
principles, and reached its decision through an exercise of reason and its decision to exclude 
Arruda and DeLong should be affirmed. 
1. The District Court followed the guidance provided by this Court in Edmunds 
v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (2006) by issuing a detailed pretrial 
order and the factual situation present in this case is distinguishable from 
that presented in Edmunds. 
In Edmunds, the trial court's pretrial order only required the plaintiffs to disclose the 
names of plaintiffs' expert witnesses by a certain date. Edmunds, 142 Idaho at 874, 136 P.3d at 
345. This Court reversed the trial court's decision to strike a second affidavit from plaintiffs' 
expert, Dr. Hollander, based upon "the timeliness of the disclosure of the opinions set forth in the 
affidavit and based on a pretrial order that only ordered the disclosure of the names of expert 
witnesses." Id. This Court also noted that Dr. Hollander's initial opinion was supplemented 
eight (8) months before trial. Id. At 874-875, 136 P.3d at 345-346. In addition, this Court stated: 
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While a court may properly order parties to disclose expert witnesses by a 
deadline, a brief order dictating the date of disclosing only the names of expert 
witnesses cannot trump the requirement ofl.R.C.P. 26(e)(l)(B) that parties 
seasonably supplement their discovery responses as new information is learned or 
expert opinions change. This does not mean a trial judge cannot issue a more 
detailed pretrial order for orderly discovery in complicated cases that would 
further clarify the general rules of discovery. 
Id. at 875, 136 P.3d at 346 (emphasis added). 
In the present matter, in line with the guidance provided by this Court in Edmunds, the 
district court issued a more detailed pretrial order (modified by the parties' stipulation) requiring 
Plaintiffs to disclose their expert witnesses, including opinions and conclusions, by October 30, 
2013. Coupled with the expert witness disclosure deadline was the requirement that EIRMC and 
any responding party raise any objections to Plaintiffs' expert witness disclosures within twenty 
(20) days of the disclosure or any such objections would be waived. Because Plaintiffs failed to 
include any opinions, conclusions, and/or information as to whether Arruda and DeLong were 
familiar with the applicable standard of health care practice or how Arruda and DeLong had 
allegedly become familiar with the applicable standard of health care practice in this case 
EIRMC objected and sought exclusion of such experts. As has been previously argued, pursuant 
to Idaho statute and Idaho case law precedent such familiarization is "part and parcel" of any 
opinions and/or conclusions that Plaintiffs' experts could hold in this matter. It is beyond dispute 
that an expert in a medical malpractice case must hold opinions and conclusions as to what the 
applicable standard of health care practice is and in this case Plaintiffs did not disclose any such 
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opinions and conclusions by the required deadline and therefore Arruda and DeLong were 
properly excluded. 
In addition to the existence of a much more detailed pretrial order in this case the instant 
matter is also distinguishable from the situation in Edmunds because in this case Plaintiffs 
attempted "supplementation" of their expert witness disclosure was going to occur less than three 
(3) months before trial (late December 2013 with trial scheduled to commence March 11, 2014) 
while in Edmunds the supplementation of Dr. Hollander's initial opinion occurred eight (8) 
months before trial. This Court recognized in Edmunds that with the supplementation occurring 
eight (8) months prior to trial adequate discovery and cross-examination could occur. Whereas, 
in this case with attempted "supplementation" occurring less than three (3) months prior to trial it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, for adequate discovery and cross-examination to occur. 
This is especially true because every time Plaintiffs attempted "supplementation" of their expert 
witness disclosure they changed the nature of the case and how EIRMC and Dr. Marano would 
have to defend the case by disclosing new, previously undisclosed opinions and a new expert 
witness. 
Consistent with the counsel given by this Court in Edmunds, the district court issued a 
more detailed pretrial order for orderly discovery in a complicated case, requiring Plaintiffs to 
disclose their expert witnesses, including opinions and conclusions by a date certain. The district 
court also coupled the expert witness deadline with a provision requiring a responding party to 
make all objections to an expert witness disclosure within twenty (20) days of the disclosure or 
waive any such objections. Plaintiffs failed to comply with the scheduling order by not setting 
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forth all of the opinions and conclusions of Arruda and DeLong and EIRMC and Dr. Marano 
made the appropriate objections. Thus, pursuant to the district court's pretrial order and 
Edmunds, EIRMC would respectfully request that this Court affirm the district court's exclusion 
of Plaintiffs' experts, Arruda and DeLong and affirm the district court's decision denying 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider its December 3, 2013 Order. 
B. The District Court's decision granting EIRMC's Motion for Reconsideration of the 
December 5, 2013, Order, including the decision to exclude Plaintiffs' experts from 
testifying should be affirmed. 
Only after EIRMC and Dr. Marano objected to Plaintiffs' expert witness 
disclosures, had a hearing on the objections, and the Court issued an Order excluding the 
experts did Plaintiffs request additional time to secure the information required to even 
allow Plaintiffs' experts to be competent. This was not, as it initially seemed from Mr. 
Barton's comments on December 3, 2013, (Tr., pp. 13, 18; L. 8-10, 20-24) a case of 
Plaintiffs being unwilling to comply with the district court's pretrial order; Plaintiffs' 
experts were unable to comply on October 30, 2013, because they were not familiar with 
the local standards of health care practice applicable to this case on said date. Plaintiffs 
attempted "supplementation" of their expert witness disclosures confirmed that as of 
October 30, 2013, Arruda and DeLong were not familiar with the applicable standard of 
health care practice at issue in the case. R. Vol. 3, pp. 232-233; 240-242. 
EIRMC was required by the district court's Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial to make 
all objections to Plaintiffs' expert witness disclosures within twenty (20) days or such objections 
would be waived. EIRMC complied with the Court's Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial and 
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objected to Arruda and DeLong as expert witness because no showing was made that they were 
familiar with the applicable standards of health care practice in this case. Allowing Plaintiffs' 
additional time to secure new, additional, and previously undisclosed expert opinions and expert 
witnesses (when EIRMC and Dr. Marano were required to expose the defects of Plaintiffs' 
expert witness disclosures) would nullify the district court's Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial 
and reward Plaintiffs dilatory conduct in waiting nearly two and a half (2 ½) years before 
attempting to locate a nursing expert in this case. 
As stated by the district court: 
At the time of the hearing, the Court sustained the object[ion] precluding the 
testimony on the grounds that the testimony was irrelevant since it was not related 
to a local standard of care. However, through various statements made at the time 
of the objection hearing [the] Court believed that the defective disclosures was 
perhaps due to inadvertence in disclosing how the experts became familiar with a 
local standard of care. 
In review, it is now clear that this was not a situation where there was an 
inadvertent failure in disclosing how the expert witnesses were familiar with 
the local standard of care, but rather a complete failure on the part of the 
expert witnesses to familiarize themselves with the standard of care. As such, 
as of the time disclosures were due, as of the time Defendants objected, as of the 
time of the hearing on the objection, and as of the time Plaintiffs' sought 
reconsideration and additional time, Plaintiffs' experts had still not familiarized 
themselves with the local standard of care. There was no showing of good cause 
why the experts had not previously familiarized themselves with the standard of 
care, but simply a request for additional time to do so. 
As previously stated, the purpose of the Court's scheduling order was to require a 
timely and orderly disclosure of expert witnesses and their testimony to allow 
parties to properly prepare for trial. This becomes particularly important in 
medical malpractice cases where the statutory scheme requires specific elements 
in an expert witness' testimony in order to proceed to trial. As numerous cases 
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have previously established, if the expert witness testimony does not include and 
relate to a local standard of care, the claims fails and summary judgment is 
appropriate. 
In short, the purpose of the scheduling order was to preclude the various motions, 
disputes and issues now arising from the Plaintiffs' inadequate disclosure of 
expert testimony. In reconsideration, this Court should not have granted 
additional time for Plaintiffs to try to acquaint witnesses Delong and Arruda with 
the applicable local standard of care. To allow additional time was a mistake. 
There was no good cause to do so, any further supplemental disclosures would be 
untimely, and the allowance of additional time defeats the original purpose of the 
scheduling order. 
Again, in reconsideration the Court believes it should have enforced its 
scheduling order. There was no good basis for extending time for Plaintiffs' 
experts to become familiar with a local standard of care. As such, Defendants' 
motion for reconsideration is granted. Because the testimony of Arruda and 
Delong as disclosed pursuant to the scheduling order did not include a familiarity 
with the local standard of care, their testimony is irrelevant and they will be 
precluded from testifying. 
R. Vol. 6, pp.768-770 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the district court's decision granting EIRMC's Motion to Reconsider and 
upholding its pretrial order should be affirmed. 
1. Plaintiffs were not attempting to supplement their original defective expert 
witness disclosures; Plaintiffs were attempting to include new previously 
undisclosed opinions to correct the defects that EIRMC and Dr. Marano 
were required to point out per the District Court's pretrial order. 
Plaintiffs attempted "supplementation" of their expert witness disclosures were not 
supplementations but the offering of new additional opinions in contravention of the district 
court's pretrial order. The present issue is analogous to the issue presented in the Idaho Federal 
District Court case of Paugh v. Ottman, Case No. CV-07-39-S-BLW (Docket No. 70 filed July 3, 
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2008). R. Vol. 5, pp. 734GG-734WW. Said case was a medical malpractice action wherein 
Plaintiffs disclosed a Dr. Julien as an expert witness two days prior to the expert witness deadline 
set by the Court's Case Management Order. R. Vol. 5, p. 734II. However, Dr. Julien's report 
did not disclose how he had familiarized himself with the local standard of care. Id. Thereafter, 
Plaintiffs filed supplemental expert witness disclosures disclosing for the first time how Dr. 
Julien became familiar with the applicable local standard of care and the substance of the process 
of familiarization. Id. One of the Defendants filed a motion to exclude the expert disclosures of 
Dr. Julien and a motion for summary judgment. 
The Idaho federal district court held: 
Rule 26(a)(2)(A) requires disclosure of the identity of any expert witness, and 
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires the expert to prepare a report containing "a complete 
statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefor." The 
rules also anticipate that circumstances may arise where it is necessary to 
supplement an expert's report. In this regard, Rule 26(a)(2)(C) requires that the 
parties "shall supplement these [ expert reports] when required under subdivision 
(e)(l)." Under subdivision (e)(l), a party is required to supplement whenever 
"the party learns that in some material respects the information disclosed is 
incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information has not 
otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in 
writing." 
The sanctions for failing to comply with these provisions are set forth in Rule 
3 7 ( c )( 1 ). Under that Rule, a party that "without substantial justification" fails to 
disclose information required by Rule 26(a), or fails to abide by the 
supplementation provisions of Rule 26( e )( 1 ), "is not, unless such failure is 
harmless, permitted to use as evidence at a trial ... information not so disclosed." 
The burden of proving substantial justification and harmlessness lie with the party 
seeking to avoid sanctions. See Yeti by Molly LTD. v. Deckers Outdoor 
Corporation, 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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Supplementation under Rule 26(e)(l) means "correcting inaccuracies, or filling in 
the interstices of an incomplete report based on information that was not available 
at the time of the initial disclosure." Keener v. United States, 181 F.R.D. 639,640 
(D.Mont. 1998). There is not true supplementation when there is a 
"dramatic, pointed variation" between the supplementation and the original, 
and the information relied on in the supplementation was available at the 
time of the original report. Id., See also, Schweizer v. Dekalb Swine Breeders, 
Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1495 (D. Kansas 1997) (excluding supplemental report of 
expert containing new opinions when there was no reason the opinions could not 
have been expressed in the expert's original report). 
In this case, Plaintiffs submitted supplemental disclosures on February 11, 2008 
and March 5, 2008. The Plaintiffs' February 11 disclosure set out the manner in 
which Dr. Julien attempted to familiarize himself with the local standard of care 
as it existed in Boise, Idaho during March of 2005. Dr. Julien accomplished this 
by speaking via telephone with Vicken Garabedian, M.D., a board certified 
radiologist, practicing in Boise, Idaho. The March 5 disclosure confirms that his 
discussions with Dr. Garabedian led him to conclude that the standard of care in 
Boise, Idaho during the relevant time period did not vary from the national 
standard of care with which he was familiar and about which he had already 
opined in his original expert witness report. 
The problem with the supplemental disclosures, is that they include a new 
opinion not previously disclosed prior to the Court's expert witness 
disclosure deadline. The conversation with Garabedian did not change Dr. 
Julien's previously stated opinion that Dr. Rau and Truska's medical care 
fell short of the national standard of care. Rather it generated a new opinion 
that the local standard of care in Boise, Idaho was the same as the national 
standard of care. As such, the March 5 supplemental disclosure was not true 
supplementation, but the offering of a new, additional opinion. 
This Court has previously rejected a proposed "supplementation" of an expert's 
report when it was in fact a new opinion. In Snake River v. Pacificorp, CIV-96-
308-E-BL W, the plaintiffs expert filed his original Rule 26 repo1i on damages in 
an antitrust case without mentioning the "spot market theory" of damages. After 
the deadline for expert disclosures had passed, the expert filed a 
"supplementation" mentioning for the first time this new theory of damages. The 
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Court rejected the supplementation, holding that it "was not a mere correction of 
inaccuracies or the 'filling in' of an incomplete report." Id. at p. 6. The Court 
also found that plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of showing substantial 
justification and harmlessness as required by Yeti by Molly, discussed above. 
The same analysis applied here. The March 5, 2008 supplemental report 
"was not a mere correction of inaccuracies or the 'filling in' of an incomplete 
report." It was the stating of a new opinion about the local standard of care. 
While the Plaintiff has shown some justification for not obtaining this 
opinion earlier, their showing does not rise to the level of substantial 
justification and is more properly considered in determining whether the local 
standard of care is indeterminable, as discussed below. The Plaintiff has, in any 
event, failed to show that the late disclosure was harmless. Accordingly, the 
supplemental reports, to the extent they state new opinions, are excluded 
under Rule 37(c)(l). In resolving the Defendants's motions for summary 
judgment and determining whether Dr. Julien is qualified as an expert 
witness to testify about the standard of care as required in Idaho Code §§ 6-
1012 et seq. the Court will only consider Dr. Julien's initial disclosure. 
R. Vol. 5, pp. 734KK-734NN (emphasis added). 
In this case, just as in the Paugh case cited above, Arruda's attempted "supplementation," 
the December 17, 2013 report, and January 10, 2014 and February 3, 2014 affidavits include 
new, additional, and previously undisclosed opinions that were not disclosed prior to this Court's 
expert witness disclosure deadline (October 30, 2013). This is not a case where the subsequent 
report and affidavits of Arruda were correcting inaccuracies or filling in an incomplete report. 
Said report and affidavits contain new, additional, and previously undisclosed opinions on how 
Arruda allegedy became familiar with the local standard of health care practice for nurses in 
Idaho Falls, Idaho in September 2010 (which efforts only took place after the expert witness 
disclosure deadline and after she had been excluded as a witness). Said report and affidavits also 
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contain new, additional, and previously undisclosed opinions that allegedly the local standard of 
health care practice that Arruda utilized in forming her opinions in her original report was the 
same or consistent with the standard of health care practice that existed for nurses in Idaho Falls, 
Idaho in September 2010. The February 3, 2014 affidavit also contains new, additional, and 
previously undisclosed opinions regarding alleged deviations from the applicable standard of 
health care practice in this case. R. Vol. 6, pp. 760-764; R. Vol. 6, pp.898-918. As such, just as 
in Paugh, Arruda's December 17, 2013 report and January 10, 2014 and February 3, 2014 
affidavits were the offering of new, additional, and previously undisclosed opinions regarding 
the applicable local standard of health care practice and deviations from such alleged standard of 
health care practice and were properly not considered by the district court. 
In addition, Plaintiffs in this matter have not shown any justification or good cause for 
not obtaining these new opinions earlier. Counsel for Plaintiffs have had this case since at least 
April of 2011. The present lawsuit was filed against EIRMC on June 17, 2011 and served in 
early July of 2011. The affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs' counsel in this matter make it clear 
that: Plaintiffs' counsel made no attempt to secure a nursing expert in this case in 2011; 
Plaintiffs' counsel made no attempt to secure a nursing expert in this case in 2012; and no 
attempt was made by Plaintiffs' counsel to secure a nursing expert in this case until the middle of 
August 2013, a mere two months prior to Plaintiffs' expert witness deadline. Plaintiffs have not 
shown any justification or good cause for not even attempting to secure a nursing expert in this 
case during 2011, 2012, or the first half of 2013. Plaintiffs had nearly two and one-half (2 ½) 
years to secure a nursing expert and familiarize a nursing expert with the local standard of health 
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care practice for nurses practicing in Idaho Falls, Idaho in September 2010 and they failed to do 
so. Plaintiffs have made no showing that they were unable to obtain the information relied on in 
Arruda's December 17, 2013 report and January 10, 2014 and February 3, 2014 affidavits in 
2011, 2012, or the first eight (8) months of 2013 so that such information, opinions, and 
conclusions were included in the original disclosure. 
In fact, it is evident that only after EIRMC and Dr. Marano objected to Plaintiffs' original 
expert witness disclosures, had a hearing on the objections, and the Court issued an Order 
excluding Arruda did Arruda make any attempt to familiarize herself with the local standard of 
health care practice for nurses practicing in Idaho Falls, Idaho in September 2010. Therefore, 
because Arruda's December 17, 2013 report and January 10, 2014 and February 3, 2014 
affidavits state new, additional, and previously undisclosed opinions regarding the local standard 
of health care practice and alleged deviations from the alleged local standard of health care 
practice the district court was correct by granting EIRMC's Motion to Reconsider and such 
decision should be affirmed. 
Further, a plain reading of the district court's December 5, 2013 Order shows that the 
district court was considering that Plaintiffs produce, for the first time, that information that 
predated the October 30, 2013 deadline, but which Plaintiffs omitted. As set forth above, it is 
evident that Plaintiffs did not have the material information and foundation necessary for the 
admission of Arruda's and DeLong's October 30, 2013, opinions before October 30, 2013. 
Plaintiffs and their experts made no attempt to obtain the material information and foundation 
necessary for the admission of Arruda's and DeLong's October 30, 2013 opinions until Arruda 
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and DeLong had been excluded as expert witnesses. Pursuant to the district court's pretrial 
order, Paugh and the district court's December 5, 2013 Order, the district court correctly 
enforced its pretrial order, did not allow new and additional opinions and conclusions beyond the 
October 30, 2013 deadline, and excluded Arruda and DeLong as expert witnesses because their 
opinions were irrelevant based upon the failure to show that they were familiar with the 
applicable standard of health care practice as of October 30, 2013. 
2. The District Court was within its discretion by excluding Plaintiffs' experts, 
especially in light of the fact that EIRMC was required to present all 
objections to Plaintiffs' expert witness disclosures within twenty (20) days of 
the disclosure or waive any and all such objections. 
"Exclusion of testimony based on late disclosure is a sanction under I.R.C.P. 37(b), and is 
subject to an abuse of discretion review." Bramwell v. South Rigby Canal Company, 136 Idaho 
648,651, 39 P.3d 588,591 (2001) (citing Noble v. Ada County Elections Bd., 135 Idaho 495, 
499-500, 20 P.3d 679, 683-684 (2000)). The exclusion of Arruda and DeLong were appropriate 
sanctions considering the provisions of the district court's pretrial order. Coupled with the 
district court's deadline for disclosing expert witnesses, including all opinions and conclusions, 
was the requirement that: 
5. Failure to object to any expert witness disclosure within twenty days 
of the required disclosure shall be deemed a waiver of objection. 
R. Vol. 1, p.89 (emphasis added). 
Per the district court's pretrial order, if EIRMC and Dr. Marano had not objected to the 
lack of Arruda's and DeLong's opinions and conclusions regarding their familiarization with the 
applicable standard of health care practice such objection would have been waived. If Arruda 
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and DeLong were not excluded as a result of Plaintiffs failure to disclose all opinions and 
conclusions of their experts (including familiarization opinions and conclusions) the district 
court would have rendered the foregoing provision of its pretrial order a nullity and would have 
required EIRMC and Dr. Marano to provide Plaintiffs with a roadmap on how to properly 
disclose their expert witnesses in this case. 
Further, if the district court would have allowed Plaintiffs additional time to secure new, 
additional, and previously undisclosed expert opinions and expert witnesses it would have 
rewarded Plaintiffs dilatory conduct in waiting nearly two and a half (2 ½) years before 
attempting to locate a nursing expert in this case. Allowing new, additional, and previously 
undisclosed expert opinions and witnesses would have also prejudiced EIRMC since such new 
and previously undisclosed opinions and witnesses would have forced EIRMC to completely re-
arrange its defense of the matter and possibly force EIRMC to retain additional expert witnesses 
itself after it had prepared its defense and secured expert witnesses based upon Plaintiffs' 
October 30, 2013, expert witness disclosure. 
The district court's January 14, 2014, Order on Defendants' Motion to Reconsider 
evidences that the district court perceived the issue of excluding Arruda and DeLong as 
one of discretion; that it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently 
with applicable legal standards; and that it reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
R. Vol. 6, pp. 767-770. Accordingly, the district court was within its discretion to 
exclude Arruda and DeLong and such decision should be affirmed. 
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C. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO SHOW "GOOD CAUSE" AND/OR 
"EXCUSABLE NEGLGECT" SUFFICIENT TO EXCUSE THEIR 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE DISTRICT COURT'S PRETRIAL 
ORDER GOVERNING DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT WITNESSES. 
Counsel for Plaintiffs both submitted affidavits in this matter in support of their motion 
seeking reconsideration of the district court's January 14, 2014, Order. Both affidavits presented 
problems which they faced and about which no party would argue are difficult aspects of their 
lives, however, such issues do not explain the non-action on their part for nearly two and a half 
(2 ½) years and their failure to seek an extension of time in which to disclose their expert 
witnesses, either by requesting a stipulation from defendants' counsel or by leave of the district 
court prior to the expiration of the expert witness deadline. 
Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice pre-litigation screening application against EIRMC 
dated April 11, 2011, which was received by the Idaho State Board of Medicine on April 15, 
2011. R. Vol. 8, pp. 1203000-1203RRR. Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against EIRMC on June 
17, 2011 and served EIRMC with the lawsuit on July 1, 2011. R. Vol 1, pp. 16-23; 24A. The 
February 3, 2014 affidavits of G. Lance Nalder and Breck Barton are completely silent on why 
absolutely no effort was made in 2011, 2012, or the first eight and a half (8 ½) months of 2013 to 
locate a nursing expert in this matter and familiarize a nursing expert with the applicable local 
standard ofhealth care practice in this case. R. Vol. 6, p. 800(iJ 4); R. Vol. 7, p. 1010 (i! 7). 
Plaintiffs did not even secure a nursing expert in this case until sometime in September 2013, a 
mere month prior to their expert witness disclosure deadline. "Good cause" or "excusable 
neglect" cannot be shown when Plaintiffs' counsel made absolutely no effort for nearly two and 
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a half (2 ½) years to locate a nursing expert in this case, only attempted to find a nursing expert a 
mere two (2) months prior to its expert witness disclosure deadline, never requested an extension 
of time for the disclosure of expert witnesses prior to October 30, 2013, and it is such dilatory 
conduct on the part of Plaintiffs' counsel that led to Plaintiffs inadequate disclosure of expert 
testimony. 
Plaintiffs' counsel also attempts to show "good cause" or "excusable neglect" by 
claiming ignorance of the requirements set forth in Court's Order and Notice Setting Jury and in 
reality ignorance ofldaho statute and Idaho case law regarding expert witness testimony in a 
medical malpractice action. Plaintiffs are represented by two (2) seasoned, experienced medical 
malpractice attorneys. There can be no question that both Mr. Nalder and Mr. Barton were/are 
aware of the requirements ofldaho Code§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013, and also aware of the numerous 
Idaho appellate cases interpreting said statutes as they relate to the applicable local standard of 
health care practice in a medical malpractice action. This Court's Order and Notice Setting Jury 
Trial, as modified by the parties' stipulation, required Plaintiffs to file their expert witness 
disclosure, including opinions and conclusions by October 30, 2013. Idaho Code§§ 6-1012 and 
6-1013 as well as Idaho case law leave no doubt that the opinions and conclusions of how an 
expert witness becomes familiar with the applicable local standard of health practice in a medical 
malpractice action are "part and parcel" of any opinions/conclusions an expert witness could 
have in this matter; i.e. if such experts do not possess opinions and conclusions regarding the 
applicable local standard of health care practice they cannot hold admissible opinions and 
conclusions regarding alleged breaches of the applicable local standard of health care practice. 
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In fact, Plaintiffs own expert witness disclosures and discovery responses betray their 
ignorance argument in that such disclosures and discovery responses represent that they are 
Plaintiffs' LR.C.P. 26 disclosures and that the disclosed expert reports contained a complete 
statement of all opinions and conclusions to be expressed in this matter (which would include 
any and all opinions/conclusions relating to familiarization with the applicable local standard of 
health care practice) and the specific facts and data upon which such opinions are based. R. Vol. 
2, pp. 168EEEEE-168GGGGG; 168IIIII-168JJJJJ; 168:XXXXX-168YYYYY. 
Plaintiffs counsel failed to ensure that their expert witnesses possessed such 
opinions/conclusions regarding the applicable local standard of health care practice prior to their 
expert witness disclosure deadline requiring the disclosure of all expert opinions and 
conclusions. This Court in Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 941 P.2d 314 (1997); 
Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387, 797 P.2d 95 (1990); Golden Condor, Inc. v. Bell, 112 Idaho 
1086, 739 P.2d 385 (1987); and the Idaho Court of Appeals decision of Washington Federal 
Savings and Loan Ass 'n v. Transamerica Premier Ins. Co., 124 Idaho 913, 865 P .2d 1004 ( Ct. 
App. 1993) have all clearly held that not even a prose litigant's failure to be aware of the 
requirements of procedural rules or ignorance of the law constitutes excusable neglect. If a pro 
se litigant's ignorance of the law does not constitute excusable neglect then Plaintiffs' counsel's 
ignorance of the district court's scheduling order and the law relating to the requirements which 
must be met to disclose admissible expert witness testimony in a medical malpractice action 
cannot be excusable neglect or good cause. 
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To recapitulate, Plaintiffs' "good cause" or "excusable neglect" in this case amounts to 
waiting two and a half (2 ½ ) years and only two (2) months prior to their expert witness 
disclosure deadline to attempt to secure and familiarize a nursing expert in this case and failing 
to do so and then claiming ignorance of Idaho statute and Idaho case law as it related to the 
district court's scheduling order in this case requiring disclosure of Plaintiffs' experts' opinions 
and conclusions. Such dilatory conduct and ignorance of the law do not constitute excusable 
neglect or good cause and accordingly Plaintiffs' second Motion for Reconsideration (seeking 
reconsideration of the district court's January 14, 2014, Order) was appropriately denied by the 
district court. 
D. ARRUDA DID NOT EVEN ATTEMPT TO BECOME FAMILIAR WITH THE 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF HEALTH CARE PRACTICE UNTIL AFTER 
SHE HAD BEEN EXCLUDED AS AN EXPERT WITNESS AND THEREFORE 
DID NOT POSSESS ADMISSIBLE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS ON 
OCTOBER 30, 2013, THE DATE HER OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS WERE 
DUE IN THIS MATTER. 
There is no dispute that as of October 30, 2013 Plaintiffs' experts Arruda and DeLong 
were not familiar with the applicable standard of health care practice for nurses practicing in 
Idaho Falls, Idaho in September 2010. Thus, as of October 30, 2013 the date on which the 
opinions and conclusions of Arruda and DeLong were due in this case said experts had no 
admissible conclusions. It is logical that if Arruda and DeLong did not even have knowledge of 
the applicable standard of health care practice at issue in the case they could not even have any 
opinions or conclusions in this case at all, inadmissible or admissible. As set forth above in 
section III.B.1 of this brief, the attempted "supplemention" by Plaintiffs of their expert witness 
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disclosures, which the district court ultimately prohibited, was not a supplementation but an 
attempt to introduce new expert opinions and conclusions beyond the disclosure date and in 
Arruda's case introduce a new expert witness in the form of an alleged familiarization expert. 
In addition, to the extent Plaintiffs contend that the district court should have considered 
the affidavits of Arruda and DeLong in support of their second motion to reconsider, seeking 
reconsideration of the district court's January 14, 2014, Order such an argument is without merit. 
New facts are only to be considered by the trial court if they bear on the correctness of the 
interlocutory order. Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 
P .2d 1026, 103 7 (1990). It would be impossible, then, for matters relating to Plaintiffs continued 
efforts and Plaintiffs' experts continued efforts beyond the rescinded December 19, 2013, 
supplementation deadline or the reporting of efforts that allegedly occurred before December 19, 
2013 which were not reported until after December 19, 2013 to be considered. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of the district court's January 14, 2014, Order 
related to whether or not the district court should have allowed or denied a fourteen (14) day 
extension of time to supplement expert witness disclosures. The district court, through its 
January 14, 2014, Order, found that it was error to allow a fourteen (14) day extension. Thus, 
the efforts made after December 19, 2013 and/or the new material that was allegedly relied upon 
prior to December 19, 2013 but not disclosed until after December 19, 2013 does not bear on the 
correctness of the January 14, 2014 order in question, which is the Order on Defendants' Motion 
for Reconsideration. 
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Further, some additional points must be noted. Elizabeth Arruda's original expert report 
in this matter dated October 28, 2013 does not mention any reliance upon IDAPA regulations, 
does not mention any reliance upon a licensure examinations for registered nurses, does not 
mention a review of any nurse licensure compact, and does not mention any EIRMC policies. R. 
Vol. 2, pp.168CCCCCC-168GGGGGG. Elizabeth Arruda's December 17, 2013 report and 
January 10, 2014 affidavit do not mention any reliance upon ID AP A regulations, do not mention 
any EIRMC policies, and for the first time state that Arruda allegedly spoke to a Rexburg 
nursing instructor about the nurse licensure compact and nurse licensure examination given in 
Idaho. R. Vol. 6, pp. 765-766. The first mention of any reliance upon ID APA regulations or 
EIRMC policies took place in Arruda's February 3, 2014, affidavit. R. Vol. 6, pp. 901-905. 
Arruda then stated in a February 28, 2014, declaration that in her initial October 28, 2013 report 
that she relied upon IDAPA regulations and the nurse licensure compact. R. Vol. 8, p. 1213. 
Notably, Arruda's October 28, 2013, report specifically sets forth records she reviewed in 
preparing her report and there is no mention of any IDAP A regulations or a nurse licensure 
compact. R. Vol. 2, pp. 168CCCCCC. 
The reports and affidavits of Elizabeth Arruda are irreconcilable. If Arruda had really 
reviewed IDAP A regulations and a nurse licensure compact prior to submitting her October 28, 
2013 report why was the fact of such review not in her October 2013 report? If Arruda was 
really basing her initial opinions on IDAP A regulations, a nurse licensure compact, and believed 
IDAPA regulations had been violated such facts are clearly opinions or conclusions that should 
have been set forth in the initial report (which they were not) and required to be disclosed by 
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October 30, 2013 (which they were not). One must also question, why, after Arruda was 
excluded as an expert witness on December 3, 2013 there no mention of any review of any 
IDAPA regulations in her December 17, 2013, report or why counsel for Plaintiffs never 
represented to the Court in multiple hearings dealing with the exclusion of their expert witnesses 
that a review and conclusion regarding IDAPA regulations took place. 
There are only two possibilities to reconcile the discrepancies between Arruda's reports 
and her affidavits/declaration. The first possibility is that the assertions contained in Arruda's 
affidavits/declaration regarding the timeline of when she reviewed ID APA regulations and/or a 
nurse licensure compact are not true. The second possibility is that Arruda and Plaintiffs' 
counsel were attempting to sand bag counsel for EIRMC in this case by not fully disclosing all of 
Arruda's opinions and conclusions in this case in the hopes that they could ambush EIRMC with 
new opinions after EIRMC disclosed its expert witnesses and corresponding opinions and 
conclusions. The second possibility is clearly in violation of the Court's Order and Notice 
Setting Jury Trial requiring the disclosure of all opinions and conclusions of the experts at the 
time of the disclosure deadline. The second possibility is also in violation of the purpose of the 
Court's Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial which was, as the district court stated: "to require a 
timely and orderly disclosure of expert witnesses and their testimony to allow parties to properly 
prepare for trial" and to "preclude the various motions, disputes and issues now arising from the 
Plaintiffs' inadequate disclosure of expert testimony." R. Vol. 6, p. 769. 
"[T]he purpose of the scheduling order was not to require Defendants to identify the 
defects of a witness disclosure and then allow Plaintiffs additional time to attempt to cure the 
33 
defects." R. Vol. 8, p. 1207. No matter what the reason for the obvious discrepancies between 
Arruda's reports and her affidavits/declaration, there is no dispute that Plaintiffs failed to comply 
with the Court's Order and Notice Setting Jury Trial, there was no good cause for the failure, and 
the Court was well within its discretion to exclude Arruda and DeLong as witnesses in this case 
as a sanction for violation of the order. 
E. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT BY NOT CONSIDERING THE 
INADMISSIBLE TESTIMONY CONTAINED IN THE AFFIDVITS FILED BY 
PLAINTIFFS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR SECOND MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Plaintiffs complain that while the district court afforded them an opportunity to submit 
affidavits in support of their second motion for reconsideration ( seeking reconsideration of the 
district court's January 14, 2014, Order) and in opposition ofEIRMC's and Dr. Marano's 
Motions for Summary Judgment it should have considered the inadmissible affidavit testimony 
of Arruda and DeLong; such a position is untenable. It is undisputed that in its January 14, 2014, 
Order the district court held that Arruda's and DeLong's testimony "is irrelevant and they will be 
precluded from testifying." R. Vol. 6, p. 770. Thus, Arruda and DeLong were precluded from 
testifying by affidavit or otherwise in the case. 
Idaho appellate courts have held: 
The admissibility of expert testimony, however, is a threshold matter that is 
distinct from whether the testimony raises genuine issues of material fact 
sufficient to preclude summary judgment. (internal citations omitted) . 
. . . This Court reviews a trial court's evidentiary rulings under the abuse of 
discretion standard. (internal citations omitted). 
34 
Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801, 804-805, 291 P.3d 1000, 1003-1004 (2012). 
In considering the evidence presented in support of or opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment "a court will consider only that material contained in 
affidavits or depositions which is based upon personal knowledge and which 
would be admissible at trial." Petricevich, 92 Idaho at 869,452 P.2d at 366; 
I.R.C.P. 56(e). In Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 
839 P.2d 1192 (1992), our Supreme Court stated that in ruling upon a motion for 
summary judgment the admissibility of the evidence contained in affidavits and 
depositions in support of or in opposition to the motion is a threshold question to 
be answered before applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences 
rule to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue for 
trial. Hecla, 122 Idaho at 778, 839 P.2d at 1198. A district court may exclude or 
not consider evidence offered by a party on its own motion, Hecla, 122 Idaho at 
778, 839 P.2d at 1196-97, or pursuant to an objection by one of the parties .... 
Thus, if the admissibility of evidence presented in support of or in opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment is raised by the court on its own motion or on 
objection by one of the parties, the court must first make a threshold 
determination as to the admissibility of the evidence before proceeding to the 
ultimate issue, whether summary judgment is appropriate. Pursuant to Hecla, if 
the evidence would be inadmissible at trial, the court should not consider the 
evidence in ruling on the motion for summary judgment. 
Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 45, 844 P.2d 24, 27 (Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis added). 
In addition, this Court has held "[ o ]n a motion for reconsideration, the court must 
consider any new admissible evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory 
order." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012) (emphasis added). 
Just like the district court in Arregui cited above (whom this Court affirmed), the district court in 
this matter correctly granted EIRMC's and Dr. Marano's motions summary judgment based 
upon the admissible evidence presented. The district court appropriately used its discretion in 
not considering the inadmissible affidavits submitted by Arruda and DeLong, whom the district 
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court had specifically precluded from testifying. Therefore, pursuant to its January 14, 2014, 
Order and Idaho case law, the district court was correct (and acted well within its discretion) by 
not considering the inadmissible affidavit testimony that was submitted in support of their 
second motion for reconsideration and in opposition to EIRMC's and Dr. Marano's Motions for 
Summary Judgment and such decision should be upheld on appeal. 
F. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT BY NOT CONSIDERING THE 
INADMISSIBLE TESTIMONY OF ARRUDA; ARRUDA HAD BEEN EXLUDED 
FROM TESTIFYING IN THE CASE; ARRUDA ATTEMPTED TO PRESENT 
NEW, ADDITIONAL, AND PREVIOUSLY UNDISCLOSED OPINIONS AND 
THE DISCLOSURE OF AN ADDITIONAL EXPERT WITNESS; AND THE 
DELAY OF GETTING ARRUDA EIRMC POLICIES WAS THE RESULT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' DILATORY CONDUCT. 
As set forth above, the district court precluded Arruda from testifying in this matter and 
both this Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have held that on summary judgment and on a 
motion for reconsideration the district court should only consider admissible evidence. The 
opinions contained in Arruda's affidavit (filed February 3, 2014) opposing EIRMC's Motion for 
Summary Judgment touching upon EIRMC policies were also new, additional, and previously 
undisclosed opinions and conclusions that were disclosed for the first time and ninety-six (96) 
days past the expert disclosure deadline for Plaintiffs (October 30, 2013), which required 
disclosure of all opinions and conclusions. In addition to being a violation of the district court's 
scheduling order, EIRMC has outlined above in section III.B.1 of this brief the reasons why the 
new, additional, and previously undisclosed opinions offered after the Plaintiffs' expert witness 
disclosure deadline should not be considered. 
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The February 3, 2014 affidavit also disclosed a new expert witness, Susan Dicus, whom 
Arruda allegedly spoke to in December of 2013 (past the expert witness disclosure deadline) 
regarding the applicable standard of health care practice. Local familiarization experts are 
"expert opinion" witnesses who must be disclosed by the expert witness disclosure deadline. 
Such experts possess and convey specialized knowledge (the applicable standard of health care 
practice) obtained by skill, experience, training, and/or education. Plaintiffs did not disclose any 
such witnesses or opinions by October 30, 2013. 
Further, only reason that Arruda did not receive EIRMC policies until January, 2014 
(over seventy (70) days past Plaintiffs' expert witness disclosure deadline) was because 
Plaintiffs' counsel did not even request such documents through discovery until December 2013: 
after all of Arruda's opinions and conclusions were due (October 30, 2013); after EIRMC and 
Dr. Marano objected to Plaintiffs' expert witness disclosures as required by the district court's 
scheduling order; after Arruda had been excluded as an expert witness; and after nearly two and 
a half (2 ½) years had expired since they had commenced their lawsuit against EIRMC. 
Plaintiffs, in their briefing, provide no explanation as to why they did not request through 
discovery any EIRMC policies in 2011, 2012, or the first eleven (11) full months of 2013. 
It is disingenuous for Plaintiffs to claim EIRMC policies were unavailable for Arruda's 
review prior to her expert witness disclosure. Such policies were available for review in 2011, 
2012, and the first eleven (11) months of 2013. The only reason Arruda could not review any 
EIRMC policies prior to making her October 2013 expert witness disclosure is because Plaintiffs 
failed to ever request them before the expert witness disclosure deadline and before Arruda was 
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excluded as an expert witness. Also, it must be noted that the discovery deadline in cases is 
almost always extended beyond the date of expert witness disclosures, not so that experts can 
continue to receive documents and information on which to base new and additional opinions 
and conclusions not disclosed at the time of the expert witness disclosure deadline, but so that 
the parties have time to depose the expert witnesses regarding their expert witness disclosures 
prior to trial and in preparation for trial. Therefore, it is a result of Plaintiffs own dilatory 
conduct that Arruda did not review any EIRMC policies prior to January of2014 and the district 
court's decision not to consider Arruda's inadmissible testimony should be affirmed. 
G. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DID NOT CONSIDER ARRUDA'S AND 
DELONG'S INADMISSIBLE AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION TESTIMONY 
SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF THEIR THIRD MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION. 
As set forth above, this Court has held "[ o ]n a motion for reconsideration, the court must 
consider any new admissible evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory 
order." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012) (emphasis added). 
It is undisputed that the district court ordered that Arruda and DeLong were precluded from 
testifying. R. Vol. 6, p. 770. Thus, there is no question that the affidavit/declaration testimony 
of Arruda and DeLong in support of their third motion for reconsideration ( seeking 
reconsideration of the district court's February 14, 2014, Order) was inadmissible because they 
had been precluded from testifying. Accordingly, the district court was correct in not 
considering inadmissible evidence submitted in support of Plaintiffs' Third Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
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In addition, the present matter is distinguishable from the facts and circumstances present 
inPuckettv. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 166, 158 P.3d 937,942 (2007) cited to by the Plaintiffs. 
Unlike in this case, there is no mention in Puckett that the district court's scheduling order 
included a provision that required a responding party to make objections to an opposing party's 
expert witness disclosures within twenty (20) days of the disclosure or waive any such 
objections. This distinction is crucial because as the district court noted in its February 14, 2014, 
Order on Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment: 
"Additionally, the purpose of the scheduling order was not require Defendants to identify the 
defects of a witness disclosure and then allow Plaintiffs additional time to attempt to cure the 
defects." R. Vol. 8, p. 1207. If Plaintiffs were allowed to cure the defects that EIRMC and Dr. 
Marano were required to point out then the district court's scheduling order would be rendered 
meaningless. 
Unlike in this case, there is no mention in Puckett that the district court entered an order 
precluding/prohibiting Plaintiffs' experts from testifying. This point is important because in this 
case none of the affidavits/declarations submitted by Plaintiffs' experts are admissible as result 
of the district court's order excluding Arruda and DeLong from testifying, whereas in Puckett 
there was no such order precluding Plaintiffs' experts from testifying and therefore submitting 
affidavit testimony. 
Further, "the purpose of the scheduling order was to require full disclosure of anticipated 
testimony and allow the opposing party time to prepare for it." R. Vol. 8, p. 1207. "The purpose 
of the order was also to preclude a flurry of motions shortly before trial regarding expert 
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witnesses, challenging testimony, and motions seeking additional time." Id. In this case, 
Plaintiffs expert witness disclosure, including all opinions and conclusions were due by October 
30, 2013. For over four ( 4) months following said deadline Plaintiffs' experts attempted to offer 
new, additional, and previously undisclosed opinions and conclusions regarding the applicable 
local standard of health care practice and alleged deviations from such standard of health care 
practice. This has not been a case of supplementation; it has been a case of shape shifting and 
Plaintiffs attempts to craft, create, and disclose new and additional expert witness opinions and 
conclusions in an attempt to remedy their original defective expert witness disclosures. 
Plaintiffs exclusively relied upon inadmissible affidavit/declaration testimony in support 
of their Third Motion for Reconsideration. Consistent with Idaho case law precedent the district 
court did not consider the inadmissible affidavit/declaration testimony and the district court's 
March 14, 2014 Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration should be affirmed. 
H. EVEN ASSUMING PLAINTIFFS ARGUMENT IS CORRECT THAT THE 
DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS FINAL JUDGMENT ANALYSIS, THE 
OUTCOME IS THE SAME BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION RELIED ENTIRELY ON INADMISSIBLE 
AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION TESTIMONY. 
Even if one were to assume that the district court erred in its final judgment/motion for 
reconsideration analysis in this case it does not obviate Plaintiffs' real problem, which was that 
their third motion for reconsideration relied entirely upon inadmissible affidavit/declaration 
testimony. This Court has held "[ o ]n a motion for reconsideration, the court must consider any 
new admissible evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order." 
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012) (emphasis added). It is 
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undisputed that the district court ordered that Arruda and DeLong were precluded from 
testifying. R. Vol. 6, p. 770. Thus, there is no question that the affidavit/declaration testimony 
of Arruda and DeLong in support of the third motion for reconsideration was inadmissible 
because they had been precluded from testifying. The district court clearly recognized this in its 
March 14, 2014 Order wherein it stated: 
The Court previously ruled that the testimony of Plaintiffs' experts was 
inadmissible. The Court then concluded that that same inadmissible testimony 
could not be used to preclude summary judgment. 
R. Vol. 8, p. 1303. 
Thus, even assuming for purposes of argument only that the district court erred in its final 
judgment/motion for reconsideration analysis, the end result is the same. Because Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Reconsideration of the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of 
EIRMC and Dr. Marano and resulting judgment rely entirely upon the inadmissible 
affidavit/declaration testimony of excluded expert witnesses there was nothing upon which the 
district court could reconsider its order granting EIRMC and Dr. Marano summary judgment. 
Accordingly, the district court's denial of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration should be 
affirmed. This Court may affirm the district court, albeit on different grounds. See Miles v. 
Idaho Power Company, 116 Idaho 635,637, 778 P.2d 757, 759 (1989). 
I. EIRMC IS ENTITLED TO ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE§ 12-121 AND RULES 40 AND 41 OF THE 
IDAHO APPELLATE RULES. 
This Court has held that a party is "entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 
12-121 if this Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought or pursued 
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frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation." Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 109-
110, 982 P.2d 940,944 (1999). In this case, the exclusion of Plaintiffs expert witnesses and 
dismissal of Plaintiffs' case is a result of Plaintiffs own dilatory conduct. Plaintiffs have not 
provided any reason why they did not secure a nursing expert in 2011. Plaintiffs have not 
provided any reason why they did not secure a nursing expert in 2012. Plaintiffs have not 
provided any reason why they did not secure a nursing expert in the first half of 2013. Plaintiffs 
have not provided any reason why they did not request an extension of time to disclose their 
expert witnesses prior to the expert witness disclosure deadline from the parties or from the 
district court. 
Plaintiffs' counsel only raised medical issues after their disclosures were due, after 
EIRMC's and Dr. Marano's required objections, and after the district court granted EIRMC's 
and Dr. Marano' s motion to exclude Arruda and DeLong. There is no question that the district 
court's scheduling order required Plaintiffs to disclose all of expert witnesses' conclusions and 
opinions by October 30, 2013 and they failed to do so. Accordingly, Plaintiffs appeal was 
brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation. Consequently, EIRMC 
is entitled to its attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs failed to timely and properly disclose their expert witnesses, including all 
opinions and conclusions of their expert witnesses in compliance with the district court's 
scheduling order. As required by the district court's scheduling order, EIRMC timely objected to 
Plaintiffs deficient expert witness disclosure and the district court ultimately excluded Plaintiffs' 
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experts, Arruda and DeLong. Since Plaintiffs had no experts who could testify regarding alleged 
breaches of the applicable standard of health care practice in this case the district court 
appropriately entered summary judgment in favor of EIRMC and Dr. Marano. 
Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of the district court's grant of summary judgment 
relied upon the inadmissible affidavit/declaration testimony of excluded witnesses Arruda and 
DeLong and appropriately said motion was denied by the district court. Plaintiffs have never 
explained why they waited nearly two and a half (2 ½) years before attempting to even locate a 
nursing expert in this case and have never explained why they never requested an extension of 
time in which to disclose their expert witnesses prior to their expert witness disclosure. 
Plaintiffs' position seems to be, that given enough time, they can make an argument that 
various standards were known, or that the standard was known to be indeterminable and that this 
was provable, or that Idaho Code§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 were complied with. Without taking on 
this constant shape shifting, Plaintiffs cannot solve the problem that they did not do what they 
needed to do and were required to do before the expiration of their expert witness disclosure 
deadline. Accordingly, EIRMC respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
decision to exclude Arruda and DeLong, affirm the district court's order granting EIRMC and 
Dr. Marano summary judgment and the accompanying judgment of dismissal, and affirm the 
district court's denial of Plaintiffs' third motion for reconsideration seeking reconsideration of 
the grant of summary judgment. 
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